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SURVEY OF NEW YORK PRACTICE
subsequent time extension would not restore the initial order of
priority.169
CPLR 6511(b): Absolute conformity with statutory content provisions
not required.
CPLR 6501 effectuates the policy that an action should not be
defeated (and justice thereby evaded) by the alienation of a defendant's
property during the pendency of an action. 70 Under this section, the
filing of a notice of pendency constitutes constructive notice that an
action affecting the title, possession, use, or enjoyment of real property
has been commenced. Thus, any subsequent purchaser from, or en-
cumbrancer against, a defendant in the action is bound by the out-
come as if he were himself a party.
In Mechanics Exchange Bank v. Chesterfield,"' the sufficiency of
a notice of pendency was challenged by the successful bidder at a fore-
closure sale. The filed notice declared that the action was brought for
the "foreclosure of a mortgage" for the sum of $13,500, while actually
this sum was the total of two mortgages which had been combined; the
second mortgage reciting that "they shall constitute in law but one first
mortgage.., for $13,500.00."172 Both mortgages were recorded.
The defect was derived from the Real Property Actions and Pro-
ceedings Law, which requires that the notice contain the date of the
mortgage, the names of the parties, and the time and place of record-
ing.173 The notice fulfilled these requirements only as to the second
mortgage.
The court, in determining the adequacy of the notice of pendency,
reasoned that the policy considerations underlying such notice' 74 only
require that the statutory provisions be followed to the extent "that
a purchaser or encumbrancer will be informed of the statutory items,
or given such information as to be put on inquiry as to them.... ,,17
Since a prospective purchaser or encumbrancer could have ascertained
that there were two mortgages involved by an examination of the
mortgage properly described in the notice of pendency, the court held
that the notice was sufficient and that the sale should be completed.
169 See 7B MCKINNEY'S CPLR 6214, supp. commentary (1968).
170 Hailey v. Ano, 186 N.Y. 569, 576, 32 N.E. 1068, 1070 (1893); Lamont v. Cheshire, 65
N.Y. 30, 26 (1875).
17134 App. Div. 2d 111, 309 N.Y.S.2d 548 (3d Dep't 1970).
172 Id. at 113, 309 N.Y.S.2d at 549.
173 RPAPL § 1331.
174 See 7 WK&M 6511.06.
175 34 App. Div. 2d at 114, 309 N.Y.S.2d at 550 (emphasis added).
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While the content requirements of CPLR 6511(b) were met,176 if a
notice of pendency fails to completely conform to that section, but does
give such information as to put a potential purchaser or encumbrancer
on inquiry notice concerning the items omitted, a court, utilizing the
rationale of the Third Department, should find the notice sufficient.
CPLR 7102: Court upholds constitutionality of replevin provision.
In Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp.,177 the Supreme Court de-
dared unconstitutional a Wisconsin statutO78 which authorized wage
garnishment without first affording the debtor an opportunity for a
hearing.179 Reasoning that wages are a "specialized type of property,"'u 0
the Court held that prejudgment garnishment violated the due process
clause. Recently, in Lawson v. Mantell,'81 New York's replevin provi-
sion - CPLR 7102 -was attacked on the grounds that it denied due
process and equal protection of the laws.
In holding that CPLR 7102 was not violative of due process, the
Lawson court cited the essential safeguards contained in article 71:
(1) an action to recover the chattel must be commenced, and defendant
must be served personally; 8 2 (2) the replevied chattel is not imme-
diately awarded to the plaintiff; 18 3 and, (3) the defendant may challenge
the adequacy of plaintiff's surety, or move to impound the chattel
during the pendency of the action.8 4
Under the guidelines set by the Supreme Court in Sniadach, this
phase of Lawson is justified. For, the New York statute provides sub-
stantial opportunity for a hearing, and it should be emphasized that
the Wisconsin statute dealt with wages: a special kind of property
which requires stricter vigilance.
The plaintiff in Lawson also asserted that compelling an under-
taking by a poor person in order to secure the return of the chattel 8 5
176 CPLR 6511(b) requires that the notice of pendency contain:
(a) the names of the parties to the action;
(b) the object of the action; and
(c) a description of the property affected.
177 395 U.S. 337 (1969), rev'g 37 Wis. 2d 163, 154 N.W.2d 259 (1967).
178 WIs. STAT. ANN. § 267.07(1) (1963).
179 The statute provided for wage garnishment merely by service on the debtor's em-
ployer and notice to the debtor within ten days thereafter. Id.
180 "A prejudgment wage garnishment.., is a taking which may impose tremendous
hardship on wage earners and their families." 395 U.S. at 340. See also Comment, Wage
Garnishment as a Collector's Device, 1967 Wis. L. Rav. 759, 767.
18162 Misc. 2d 307, 806 N.YS.2d 317 (Sup. Ct. Albany County 1969).
182 CPLR 7102(a) & (b).
183 Under CPLR 7102(f) the chattel is held for a period of three days, during which
time the defendant has an opportunity to reclaim it.
184 CPLR 7102(f); CPLR 7103(a) & (b).
185 CPLR 7103(a).
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